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Abstract
Research summary: Using collective action and social
movement theory, we investigate the potential incen-
tives and ability of stakeholders to engage in collective
action that can increase firm-specific nonmarket risk of
mining companies. We argue that proximity to the
nearest environmentally sensitive water source
increases the probability that local stakeholders will
take collective actions that impose material costs on the
focal mine. We hypothesize that stock markets recog-
nize this nonmarket risk and apply a discount on
announcements related to mines located near such
areas, and that these risks are moderated by the type of
mineral, the nature of the water source, and the
strength of host country institutions. Using a unique
data set and an event study method, we find support
for most of our arguments.
Managerial summary: We argue that mines located
near environmentally sensitive water sources are sub-
ject to nonmarket risks arising from the potential col-
lective actions of local stakeholders and their allies.
Stakeholder mobilization can impose material costs on
a mine in the form of delays, regulatory hurdles, and
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closure. We find that stock markets recognize these
nonmarket risks and apply a discount on announce-
ments by mining companies whose mines are located
near environmentally sensitive water sources, particu-
larly rivers. However, we also find that investor reac-
tion is stronger in countries with strong institutions
that support collective action. Thus, nonmarket risk
management is important even in countries that are
typically characterized by low political and institutional
risks. We discuss the degree to which these results can
be generalized beyond mining.
KEYWORD S
collective action, institutions, mining, nonmarket risk, social
movements
1 | INTRODUCTION
Firm-specific nonmarket risks arise from a variety of social, political, and environmental events
that can impose material costs on a firm (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Lawton, McGuire, &
Rajwani, 2013). Research on nonmarket risks has for the most part focused on political and
institutional risks (Henisz & Zelner, 2012; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Lawton et al., 2013;
Werner, 2017), but there is increasing evidence that stakeholder mobilization through social
movements can materially affect a focal firm (de Bakker, den Hond, King, & Weber, 2013;
Dorobantu, Henisz, & Nartey, 2017; Henisz, Dorobantu, & Nartey, 2014; King & Soule, 2007),
making the management of such stakeholders a critical feature of corporate strategy.
In this study, we use the theory of collective action (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2000) together
with the theory of social movements (Davis, Morrill, Rao, & Soule, 2008; Kriesi, 2004; McAdam,
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996) as applied to stakeholders (King, 2008) to argue that the potential for
localized negative externalities created when a firm located near environmentally sensitive
water sources provides both the incentive and ability for local stakeholders to engage in collec-
tive action to prevent such externalities. We apply this logic to the global mining industry and
argue that collective action, based on fear of scarcity and contamination of water, is more likely
the closer a mine is to an environmentally sensitive water source, and that the threat from col-
lective action constitutes a potential firm-specific nonmarket risk. Previous studies examine the
impact of stakeholder groups that have already formed in response to a firm's actions
(Dorobantu, Henisz, et al., 2017; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; McDonnell, King, &
Soule, 2015; Vasi & King, 2012), we examine the ex ante conditions under which they are likely
to form and take action to prevent the potential negative effects of a firm's actions.
We use collective action theory to analyze the incentives for groups to act. The theory of col-
lective action (Olson, 1965) suggests that within a group, the possibility of collective action is
limited by the free rider problem. We argue that the localized negative externality of mining
activities (Shapiro, Hobdari, & Oh, 2018) concentrates costs and thereby increases the incentive
to undertake collective action. In addition, because the externality often affects traditional local
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communities, the incentive to collective action is further increased because shared values and
interests solidify trust and reciprocity, which in turn limits free riding (Ostrom, 2000; Rowley &
Moldoveanu, 2003).
We elaborate on this argument using social movement theory to evaluate the ability of
groups to undertake collective action. Social movement theory typically focuses on specific
forms of collective action, often but not exclusively associated with groups undertaking actions
outside of institutional or organizational channels (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004). However, it
has also been applied more generally to collective action by stakeholders of various kinds orga-
nizing both within and outside of existing institutional structures (King, 2008; McAdam
et al., 2010), with firms often being the targets. Social movement theory points to three critical
mechanisms that facilitate collective action (Giordono, Boudet, Karmazina, Taylor, &
Steel, 2018; King, 2008; McAdam et al., 1996). These are the ability to mobilize resources (mobi-
lizing structures); the strength and accessibility of government (political opportunities); and the
ability to frame issues so as to mobilize not only the local community but also more distant
communities and supportive stakeholders (framing structures).
Drawing on the experience of the global mining industry, we develop and test four hypothe-
ses focusing on mine location, both within and across countries. First, we argue that mines
located near environmentally sensitive water sources are subject to cost-increasing collective
actions by local stakeholders. We argue, in particular, that the potential for mines to inflict
damage on local water supplies and to compete for scarce water resources creates a stronger
incentive to engage in collective action, and in addition enhances the ability to mobilize com-
plementary institutions including government and the courts, and to frame issues to attract
media and NGO attention. We therefore hypothesize that mine location within a country, mea-
sured in terms of proximity to the nearest significant water source, adjusted for the degree of
risk to water quantity and quality, increases firm-specific nonmarket risk so that stock markets
respond negatively to announcements related to mines located near such areas.
We consider three different factors moderating the effect of mine location. We first argue
that the effect of mine location is moderated by the nature of the ore being mined. Specifically,
we hypothesize that gold mines carry more ex ante risk than other mines because the technol-
ogy associated with gold mining requires extensive use of water and increases risks of water
contamination. We then argue that the type of the nearest water source also matters, and we
thus distinguish mines located near rivers from those located near lakes. We argue that mines
located near rivers are subject to greater risk because rivers extend the number of affected com-
munities, thus increasing the probability of diffused collective action.
Finally, we consider differences across countries and institutional contexts. We develop a
specific measure of institutional context based on the capacity of a country's institutions to sup-
port collective action and social movements, and we argue that collective action that imposes
costs on companies is more likely in countries where such institutions are strong. Drawing on
both social movement theory and institutional theory, we suggest that when government access
freedom of the press and the judicial system are strong, collective action is better tolerated, and
stakeholders are better able to access relevant resources, including government resources. Thus,
we hypothesize that stock markets' negative response associated with within-country mine
proximity increases in host countries with strong institutions that support collective action.
To test our hypotheses, we construct a unique data set that includes exact measures of mine
location in each country, and these are matched to the proximity of the nearest significant
water source, as defined by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (Lehner & Döll, 2004) and
the World Resources Institute (WRI) (Gassert, Luck, Landis, Reig, & Shiao, 2014). We employ
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an event study methodology to measure potential firm-specific nonmarket risks. On balance,
our results strongly indicate that stock markets impose a discount on announcements made by
companies whose mines are located nearer to environmentally sensitive water sources, notably
rivers, and the effect is stronger when the relevant institutional context of the country is
stronger.
This study contributes in a number of ways to the analysis of nonmarket and institutional
risk in both the international business strategy and nonmarket strategy literature studies. First,
we contribute to the literature on nonmarket risk arising from stakeholder actions by using col-
lective action and social movement theory to provide a theoretically grounded framework for
evaluating the potential incentives and abilities for stakeholders to act. In particular, we orga-
nize our analysis around the possibility of localized negative externalities presented by mines
located near at-risk water sources. Second, we add to the relatively small number of manage-
ment and business studies that specifically examine nonmarket risk related to stakeholder
actions in the context of social and environmental issues where firm-imposed negative external-
ities can be important (Dorobantu, Henisz, et al., 2017; Dorobantu & Odziemkowska, 2017;
Henisz et al., 2014), while also responding to the call to introduce cross national institutional
differences into the literature (Davis et al., 2008; Hawn, Chatterji, & Mitchell, 2018; Mellahi,
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016).
Finally, our approach extends and integrates the international business strategy and non-
market strategy literature studies with respect to institutional risks. The two literature studies
both take a transaction cost approach to institutional risk, suggesting that transaction costs are
higher in weaker institutional environments, leading to greater nonmarket institutional risk
(Beugelsdijk, Ambos, & Nell, 2018; Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017; Mudambi et al., 2018).
We focus on nonmarket risks that arise from the potential of firms to impose negative externali-
ties on communities. This leads us to conclude that nonmarket risks are higher in countries
with strong institutions supporting collective action, suggesting a more nuanced approach to
nonmarket risk across countries.
2 | LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Literature review
We use the theories of collective action and social movements to argue that potential localized
negative externalities can create conditions under which local stakeholders engage in potential
collective actions that would impose significant costs on a focal firm. Collective action is typi-
cally defined by actions taken by a group with shared interests, whose actions are meant to fur-
ther those interests (e.g., King, 2008; Olson, 1965). Social movements are closely related in that
they are organized groups of outsiders that act to consciously promote a shared interest through
collective action that includes both institutional and extra-institutional actions (Dorobantu &
Odziemkowska, 2017). Social movement theory therefore examines “the conditions under
which collective action by outsiders to dominant societal institutions emerges and facilitates
access to those institutions, allowing outsiders to potentially affect social and political change”
(King, 2008, p.23). In the present context, outsiders are understood to be external stakeholders,
who are in some way affected by the actions of a focal firm, and seek, through collective action
to influence or change those actions (Davis et al., 2008; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Rowley &
Moldoveanu, 2003).
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Olson (1965) provides the classic analysis of collective action and suggests that collective
action within a group is difficult because of the free rider problem. That is, if collective action
involves the provision of a public good to members, there is an incentive for rational individuals
not to join the group, because they can enjoy the benefits without incurring the costs of mem-
bership. Under these conditions, the incentive to join a group is low and collective action
becomes difficult (McAdam & Boudet, 2012). We do, however, observe that groups not only
form, but their actions can have significant impacts on target organizations (Bartley &
Child, 2014; Dorobantu, Kaul, et al., 2017; King & Soule, 2007). There are several explanations
as to how, despite the obstacles, collective action occurs.
Olson (1965) himself recognized the boundary conditions surrounding his argument, and there-
fore suggested that the incentive to form a group is higher when the group is relatively small, because
the costs of organizing and coordinating the group are lower. Thus, smaller, localized groups are
more likely to organize and be effective. Although Olson tended to emphasize individual self-interest,
Ostrom (2000) pointed to the social dimensions of groups, arguing that collective action also requires
social cooperation, which is more likely when people are involved in long-term relationships and
embedded in networks with strong social norms. Although the approach is different, it is reasonable
to conclude that this analysis also suggests that the incentive for collective action is higher in smaller
groups embedded in local communities where rules, norms, trust, and reciprocity enhance the bene-
fits of collective action (Agrawal, 2014; Ostrom, 2000).
The social movement literature (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; King, 2008; McAdam
et al., 1996) builds on these arguments and suggests three factors that increase the likelihood of
collective action: mobilizing structures; political opportunities; and framing structures. Mobilizing
structures include the factors that support or limit social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977),
including the ability to access external support and the degree to which authorities limit group
formation. Political opportunities include the political and institutional structures (Gamson &
Meyer, 1996; Kriesi, 2004) that provide access to open governments with the capacity to under-
take relevant supportive actions. Framing structures promote shared definitions and identifica-
tion with the issue, so as to mobilize both the local community and more distant communities
(Bach & Blake, 2016; Benford & Snow, 2000). Thus, the literature suggests that when local com-
munities are threatened in some way by the actions of a company, the probability of collective
action increases due to the strength of local networks and access to complementary stakeholders
such as governments, the courts, the media, and NGOs (Giordono et al., 2018; King, 2008).
Although there is a considerable literature on collective action and social movements, there
are few studies that explicitly link collective action to nonmarket risk across institutional con-
texts (Davis et al., 2008; Mellahi et al., 2016). To our knowledge, it is still the case that cross-
national studies looking at market responses to nonmarket risk, and in particular nonmarket
risk related to stakeholder actions, are rare (Hawn et al., 2018). Recently, Dorobantu and
Odziemkowska (2017) examine the effects of institutional differences among Canadian com-
munites, and point to the need to extend the analysis across borders. Within the social move-
ment literature, there are few cross-country studies that examine the impact of collective action
on firms (Kirchherr, Charles, & Walton, 2016; McAdam et al., 2010).
2.2 | Context: Global mining industry
In this study, we apply these ideas to the global mining industry. We focus on mining because
there is considerable evidence that the extractive industries have relatively unique
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characteristics (Shapiro et al., 2018), including the perception that mining companies pose
greater environmental risks than other companies (King & Soule, 2007). Mining projects are
often located in remote and environmentally sensitive areas around the world, dictated by min-
eral availability, and their environmental impacts can have significant localized effects on com-
munities (Aragón & Rud, 2016; Aragón-Correa, Marcus, & Hurtado-Torres, 2016; Berman,
Couttenier, Rohner, & Thoenig, 2017; Dorobantu & Odziemkowska, 2017). Thus, the environ-
mental and social impacts of mining are large and increasing, resulting in conflicts with local
communities and other stakeholders that in turn impose costs on the companies (Andrews
et al., 2017; Davis & Franks, 2014; Stevens, Kooroshy, Lahn, & Lee, 2013). Environmental and
social risks act in combination with create potentially costly firm-specific nonmarket risks for
mining companies, as communities mobilize to oppose their activities (Andrews et al., 2017;
Franks et al., 2014; Mutti, Yakovleva, Vazquez-Brust, & Di Marco, 2012).
In addition, mining projects are large and have long gestation periods as they progress along
a value chain from geoscience research to exploration, mine planning and construction, mine
development and operation, and closure (Davis & Franks, 2014). These long gestation periods
can take decades, are typically complex, and are associated with potential environmental and
social risks at each stage (Davis & Franks, 2014). At any (or each) stage, opportunities arise for
local stakeholders to take collective action, and companies are likely to interact with multiple
stakeholders to deal with complex social and environmental issues at each stage of the value
chain. The outcomes of these interactions can be both difficult to forecast and costly to the firm
(Berman et al., 2017; Kemp & Owen, 2013).
Although mining can affect communities and the environment in various ways, we choose
to focus on water for several related reasons. First, mining activities are known to have particu-
larly significant effects on local water supplies (Bebbington & Williams, 2008; Ossa-Moreno
et al., 2018). Mines not only use large amounts of water, potentially competing with local users,
but they can also damage the water supply through discharges involving tailings, mercury, and
cyanide (Mudd, Northey, & Werner, 2017). Thus, NGOs such as the WWF identify water pollu-
tion as one of the most serious ecological threats, with mining specifically identified as a cause
of water pollution.1 Second, access to water (and sanitation) is recognized by the United
Nations (UN) as a human right (Kemp, Bond, Franks, & Cote, 2010), because lack of access to
safe, sufficient, and affordable water and sanitation constitutes a threat to human health and
dignity.2 The World Bank notes water scarcity as a problem affecting 40% of the world's popula-
tion3 and protection of water resources is covered under a number of UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs)(Wendling, Emerson, Esty, Levy, & de Sherbinin, 2018). For these reasons,
we establish our hypotheses focusing on water.
2.3 | Mining location
Our argument is that proximity to an environmentally sensitive water source increases the
potential for a mine to impose environmental damage on, or compete for, resources valued by
local communities, and this in turn provides an incentive and ability to engage in collective
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proximity to an environmentally sensitive water source is a proxy measure for the potential
nonmarket risks associated with stakeholder collective action and is identified as such by stock
markets.
The environmental science literature emphasizes that the proximity of mining sites to envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas is important because of the direct impact of mining operations on
surrounding environments (e.g., Erftemeijer & Lewis, 2006; Schmitt et al., 2007). Water ecosys-
tems have been identified as being particularly vulnerable (Ossa-Moreno et al., 2018; World
Resources Institute, 2010). Thus, mines located close to environmentally sensitive water sources
are more likely to have the potential to damage local water supplies, or to compete for scarce
water resources, with consequent effects on local communities, including farmers and fisher-
men. Moreover, because mining communities or communities near mines tend to be relatively
small and in remote areas of many countries (Veiga, Scoble, & McAllister, 2001), and because
water is so critical to human health and economic welfare (Bebbington & Williams, 2008), the
effects of the potential negative externality are strong and concentrated on a relatively small
number of people. Furthermore, recent studies suggest that as technology has improved, mining
has moved into even more remote areas with small communities (Conde & Le Billon, 2017).
Therefore, the concentrated localized costs and the size of the affected groups provide strong
incentives for collective action, limiting the free-rider problem.
In addition, we argue that these same local communities also meet the criteria for the ability
to engage in collective action, as set out in the social movement literature. There is general evi-
dence that within a local community impacted by mining, members are socially cohesive, with
high levels of involvement and interaction (Wright & Bice, 2017). Thus, local communities sur-
rounding mining sites are likely to have robust community networks, particularly when facing
some external threat. In addition, the degree of social cohesion may increase when the affected
communities are indigenous groups with distinctive cultures (Hanna, Langdon, &
Vanclay, 2016), which is becoming increasingly true as mining activities become more remote
(Conde & Le Billon, 2017).
Thus, because their numbers are relatively small, and because they are often traditional or
indigenous communities with strong norms (O'Faircheallaigh, 2013), it is easier to access and
motivate neighbors to act and the ability to engage in collective action is also increased. More-
over, because of the internationally recognized importance of water as a natural resource and
its links to human rights and sustainable development, water disputes can be framed in a way
that permit local communities to both access the political system and develop a strong network
of relevant stakeholders, including the media and NGOs (Rowley, 1997). In so doing, they can
impose significant reputation costs on a focal mining company (King & Soule, 2007).
In the mining industry, the direct costs arising from collective action arise primarily through
the ability of stakeholders to impose project delays, shutdowns, and closures (Franks
et al., 2014). The delays and shutdowns may be caused by protests that block access to the mine
or through more institutional means including political and legal injunctions. When there are
conflicts over these resources, both communities and NGOs may put pressure on governments
to strengthen regulations (such as more stringent environment impact assessments) and more
closely monitor mining operations in ways that delay temporarily, or permanently suspend,
operations (Stevens et al., 2013). In addition, communities may engage in legal action to stop or
delay the project, to seek redress for access to land, or to find early evidence of polluting activity
(Stevens et al., 2013, p. 26). These actions may occur even before the mine is in operation but
can continue into the operation phase. Thus, the nature of the mining life cycle affords
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stakeholder multiple political opportunities to engage in collective action, with the possibility of
imposing costly delays at each stage.
Franks et al. (2014, p. 6) and Stevens et al. (2013, p. 27) provide numerous examples of min-
ing projects that were delayed or abandoned because of various conflicts arising from the pro-
ject. In addition to delays and shutdowns, collective action may inflict reputational damage on
the focal firm. In general, firms that pose potential threats to the environment, and in particular
areas known to be environmentally sensitive, are subject to reputation risk (Hart, 1995). We
argue that this is particularly true in the case of mines that pose potential risks to water sources.
Disputes over water can be framed so as to both engage a wide variety of supportive stake-
holders and impose reputational damage on mining companies that are seen to threaten water
supplies.
Thus, as noted by Paredes (2016), although mining operations have been extended into
more remote communities, the capacity of these communities to engage with networks around
the world has increased, in part because of social media (Hodges & Stocking, 2016). We suggest
that this ability is more likely when the issue can be framed around human rights, resource
scarcity, and threats to human health, as is the case with water. Thus, following social move-
ment theory, we argue that mines located near environmentally sensitive water sources are not
only more likely to become involved in disputes with local communities, but that these commu-
nities have multiple political opportunities to engage, and are able to mobilize strong support
among national and global NGOs, who in turn provide access to global media coverage that
may impact the reputation of the firm.
We therefore conclude that mines located in closer proximity to environmentally sensitive
water sources are subject to potential nonmarket risks arising from conflict with local stake-
holders that can create project delays and temporary or permanent mine closures, and the con-
flict also poses a threat to the value of the firm's intangible assets (reputation). We emphasize
that these potential costs associated with stakeholder action can be incurred at every stage of
the mining life cycle (Franks et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2013), so that each stage, including the
pre-production stage, constitutes a potential mobilization point for stakeholders.
We illustrate these points using the case of Barrick Gold.4 Barrick Gold (TSX, NYSE: ABX),
headquartered in Canada, is one of the largest gold mining companies in the world with mining
operations in North and South America, Africa, and Papua New Guinea. Barrick developed the
huge Pascua Lama mining project high in the Andes, at an altitude of some 5,000 m. The pro-
ject is set in a remote and environmentally sensitive mountain highland among ancient glaciers
with the potential to impact waterways and mountain wetlands. The area holds gold and silver
reserves that are among the largest in the world. Exploration for the project began in 1994, after
Barrick acquired the assets of Lac Minerals Corporation. In 2006, the plan was approved by
Chile's regulatory commission with more than 400 conditions, many of which reflected the con-
cerns of local stakeholders including protection of the glaciers and other water sources. Construc-
tion began in 2009 but was halted in 2013. The project remains on hold as of 2019.
The case illustrates the importance of collective action by local communities, and the
various ways in which collective action can occur. Opposition to the project was immediate and
centered around water and the nearby glaciers. Water was critical to farmers in the Huasco Val-
ley, downstream from Pascua Lama in the Atacama Desert, including in particular the Diaguita,
an indigenous group legally recognized by the Chilean government in 2006. Local communities,
4The material related to Barrick is taken in large part from Smith and McCormick (2014) with updates from MINING.
com (http://www.mining.com/) and various news sources such as Reuters.
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notably the Diaguita, faced with potential threats to their water sources, began to organize to
halt the project. Their actions included protests, judicial challenges, and regulatory interven-
tions, including one at the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. In addition to adding
conditions to the original 2006 permit, pressure and legal action resulted in Barrick being fined
US$16 million in 2013 for noncompliance with requirements to protect the glaciers and water
sources. At the same time, the Diaguita launched another court case, arguing that the company
had failed to protect its environmental and human rights, which resulted in a court-ordered sus-
pension of construction activity. Later in that year, Barrick, under heavy financial pressure,
suspended the project. Although Barrick has indicated that it would consider restarting the pro-
ject, it continues to meet resistance, including in the Chilean courts and by international NGOs.
In addition, after the suspension, Barrick was subject to an US class action lawsuit accusing the
company of misrepresenting the status of Pascua Lama in disclosures to investors, and agreed
to pay US$140 million in settlement. The resulting reputational damage may make it difficult
for Barrick to obtain future funding for the project. As these events unfolded and escalated, pro-
ject costs rose from an original US$3 billion, to over US$8.5 billion. Ultimately Barrick wrote
down the value of the project by roughly US$6 billion. Its share price in 2012 was C$55 and fell
to C$8.43 in 2015. As of December 2019, it was trading in the C$20 range.
Thus, this case demonstrates the incentive to collective action created by a localized nega-
tive externality related to water and experienced by an indigenous community with strong com-
munity values. The community was able to mobilize itself and other communities to protest the
presence of the mine using a variety of mechanisms, including legal and regulatory interven-
tions, as well as by appeals to other external stakeholders including NGOs.
In summary, and as the Barrick case illustrates, we argue that the proximity of a mine to an
environmentally sensitive water source increases the potential nonmarket risks of mining com-
panies. The critical importance of water as a shared resource, and its relation to human health
and livelihood, creates a strong incentive for local stakeholders to take collective action against
a focal mine. The risks therefore arise from the potential costs associated with delays, suspen-
sions, or cancellations of projects or operating mines, and from potential reputational risks, all
the result of stakeholder collective action. These potential costs, although different, can occur at
any stage of the mine life cycle, and thus announcements indicating that a mine is about to
enter a new phase provides new information to markets. This leads to:
Hypothesis 1 The more proximate is a mine to an environmentally sensitive water source, the
more stock markets will discount any announcement bringing a mine closer to full operation
or any announcement that will expand current output.
2.4 | Type of mineral
In general, the environmental impacts of mining operations differ significantly by ore type and
grade, mineral composition, mining methods (e.g., open pit vs. underground), and technology
(Durucan, Korre, & Munoz-Melendez, 2006). In the same vein, the impact on water, the most
important resource in mining operations (Ossa-Moreno et al., 2018), also differs based on these
factors, which are largely determined by the type of mineral being mined. Thus, the probability
of social disputes and conflicts involving mining companies and communities may vary
according to the nature of the mineral being mined (Durucan et al., 2006).
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Gold mining has been identified as having the greatest impact on water resources
(Kumah, 2006) based on both the quantity of water consumed during production and the use of
cyanide to remove impurities during processing. Several studies provide evidence that gold min-
ing consumes more water than other minerals (Mudd, 2008; Northey, Haque, Lovel, &
Cooksey, 2014). This is mainly due to mineral grade; generally, the lower the grade, the more
water consumed during extraction and gold ore shows the greatest long-term decline in grade
among minerals studied (Mudd, 2008; Northey et al., 2014). In addition to low ore grade,
Mudd (2008) found that gold mining has the lowest water efficiency, meaning that gold mines
consume more water per tonne of ore than do other minerals. High levels of water consumption
by gold mines can therefore be a particular threat to water security in local communities by
increasing competition for scarce water resources. It was in fact water scarcity concerns sur-
rounding a gold mine that led El Salvador to ban all mining activity in that country
(Palumbo & Malkin, 2017).
In addition to competing for scarce water resources, gold mining can pollute local water
resources, because it uses chemicals such as cyanide to process gold ore, which carries with it
the risk of toxic pollution for the soil and groundwater (Hilson & Monhemius, 2006). Potential
social and environmental damage results from the possibility of leaching into water sources
during the process and/or leaking and spillage from tailings storage areas. For example, in
2000, a cyanide spill at the Baia gold mine in Romania resulted from the collapse of a tailings
dam (Cunningham, 2005). Cyanide spilled into local rivers and flowed into the Danube, the sec-
ond largest river in Europe, and subsequently into the Black Sea. As a consequence, approxi-
mately 1,200 t of fish were killed throughout Romania and six other countries and Hungary
suffered massive water contamination (Cunningham, 2005).
Thus, we conclude that gold mining may present a special threat to water resources, and the
likelihood of collective action therefore increases when the focal mine is a gold mine. Accord-
ingly, we propose:
Hypothesis 2 The negative announcement effects of a mining property's proximity to an environ-
mentally sensitive water source will increase (i.e., be more negative) when the focal mine is a
gold mine.
2.5 | Water source
The nearest significant water source to a mine could be a river or a lake. We argue that the neg-
ative impacts of mining operations on rivers and lakes are not the same, nor are the potential
responses of affected communities. These differences arise from a fundamental distinction
between rivers and lakes: mobility. As rivers flow, pollutants from mining operations spread
across heterogeneous communities, with resultant implications for the possibility and effects of
collective action (Bebbington & Williams, 2008). In particular, any collective action begun by
the community most affected by the focal mine may diffuse across other communities as water
flows downstream. Diffused collective action can enhance both the mobilization of resources
and the effectiveness of framing structures related to the focal mine.
The diffusion of a collective action across heterogeneous communities is more likely when
they share grievances (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Thus, when the
expected values and payoffs of a potential collective action overlap among communities, the
communities have an interest-based motive to jointly mobilize (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).
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In this case, the spread of the negative externality from the focal mine can create a shared griev-
ance among communities along the river that diffuses the possibility of collective action to more
distant downstream communities. In addition, the negative externality creates interdependence
among communities facilitating diffusion through a bandwagon effect (Hargrave & Van de
Ven, 2006), which may begin with mimic behavior by more proximate communities (Soule, 1997).
The participation of more communities then applies pressure on others to participate in a broader
movement, limiting free riding across communities (Soule, 1997; Tarrow, 1998).
As collective action diffuses, generating a cumulated bandwagon effect (della Porta &
Diani, 1999; Gavious & Mizrahi, 2001), a critical mass can be created, increasing the potential for
success (Gavious & Mizrahi, 2001; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Oliver & Marwell, 1988). In addi-
tion to increasing political opportunities, the larger the group size, the more the attention from the
media (Myers, 2000). Once sufficient media attention is captured, public attention also surges
(Markus, 1987). Enhanced media access and public attention increase the ability for social move-
ments to frame the issues and attract broader stakeholder support (Gamson & Meyer, 1996).
We therefore conclude that the potential for collective action increase when such action can
diffuse to other communities and stakeholders, and this is more likely when the affected water
source is a river. Thus, the potential costs to a focal mine will be greater if the nearest signifi-
cant environmentally sensitive water source is a river:
Hypothesis 3 The negative announcement effects of a mining property's proximity to an environ-
mentally sensitive water source will increase (i.e., be more negative) when the water source is
a river.
2.6 | Host country institutions
The mining industry is global, and mines are located in a large number of countries with con-
siderable institutional variation (Shapiro et al., 2018). There seems to be agreement in both the
international business strategy and social movement literature studies that it is important to
match the measures of institutional difference employed to the underlying theoretical structure
and specific context being examined (Beugelsdijk et al., 2018; Gamson & Meyer, 1996). For the
purposes of this study¿, we examine institutional differences across countries that might
strengthen or weaken the incentives and ability to engage in collective action, within the con-
text of the global mining industry. The very existence of the mine, and in our case its proximity
to significant water resources, represents a potential threat to the community, providing an
incentive to organize. However, the ability to organize may be quite different across institu-
tional contexts (McAdam et al., 2010).
We argue that the ability of local stakeholders to engage in effective collective action is
stronger in countries with institutions that support movement mobilization (mobilizing struc-
tures), access to political channels (political opportunity), and freedom of information including
a free press (framing structures). These correspond to the critical success factors identified in
the social movements literature discussed earlier (King, 2008; McAdam et al., 1996; McAdam
et al., 2010). Thus, although there are a large number of dimensions that can define institu-
tional differences across countries, we focus on those that are most likely to support collective
action by relevant stakeholders in the context of the mining industry.
It is generally understood that mining activity relies on both a legal license to operate (LLO)
and a social license to operate (SLO) (Owen & Kemp, 2013; Prno & Slocombe, 2012), and both
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provide opportunities for collective action because both provide various legal, political, and social
avenues for external stakeholders to impose costs on focal firms (Franks et al., 2014). We argue that
these opportunities are greater in countries with institutions that better support collective actions.
The LLO can impose a large number of regulatory requirements on a mine, often revisited
or revised at various stages of the mining cycle, and this provides stakeholders with a number
of opportunities to take actions that impose delay or closure costs on mines (Stevens
et al., 2013). In essence, they provide greater political access to local stakeholders because they
have more points of potential contact with the regulatory authorities (Kriesi, 2004; McAdam
et al., 2010). For example, the existence and strict enforcement of Environmental Impact
Assessments creates the potential for local stakeholders to participate in, and influence the out-
come of, regulatory hearings. In addition, the very existence of these regulations provides a
strong signal to stakeholders that corporations are vulnerable to collective action (King, 2008).
Thus, in countries with stronger legal systems and better channels for political access, the prob-
ability of institutional collective action increases, and with it the degree of nonmarket risk.
However, mines also require an SLO, and this too creates the conditions for collective action,
both institutional and noninstitutional. The term SLO generally refers to the need for mining
companies to ensure community acceptance of their presence. We suggest that obtaining an SLO
is costlier in countries with institutions that provide affected local stakeholders with stronger
mechanisms to oppose mining companies, including access to the media and the courts, thus
strengthening their bargaining position (Dorobantu & Odziemkowska, 2017; McAdam
et al., 2010). In addition, countries with accessible political systems typically promote inclusion
of civil society in decision-making processes, again providing stakeholders with more voice,
including the right to protest, guaranteed by laws protecting freedom of speech, assembly, and
association. Such protests may become translated into project delays and legal costs, thus increas-
ing nonmarket risks (Dorobantu & Odziemkowska, 2017; Franks et al., 2014), or into the costly
provision of local public goods and community infrastructure (Dorobantu, Kaul, et al., 2017;
Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Shapiro et al., 2018). Thus, we argue that an SLO is costlier to obtain
in countries with strong legal institutions and accessible political institutions, which better allow
affected stakeholders to impose costly delays and infrastructure costs on firms.
We have earlier noted that collective action may inflict reputational damage on the focal
firm (Henisz et al., 2014). Mining companies affecting water resources can be particularly vul-
nerable when their actions are heavily scrutinized by the media and NGOs. The ability to frame
disputes around environmental issues in general, and water in particular, will depend on access
to media, both national and international (Paredes, 2016). Both Gamson and Meyer (1996) and
Kriesi (2004) single out the media as an important element in defining the opportunity struc-
ture for collective action, and this may be even more true in the age of social media (Hodges &
Stocking, 2016). A free press also makes it easier for stakeholders to access relevant information
about firms and makes it more difficult for the firms to conceal or suppress negative informa-
tion. Thus, we argue that in countries where freedom of the press is more strongly protected,
the resources available for collective action are increased, in part because the issues become
legitimized through a free press. In particular, in countries with a strong and free press, poten-
tial stakeholders outside the focal country are more likely to be aware of events within it, which
can enhance the reputational damage inflicted on the firm. We conclude that the probability of
collective action in the mining industry is more likely in countries with strong legal institutions,
accessible political institutions, and freedom of the press.
All of these arguments are present in the Barrick case, as discussed earlier. It is important to
emphasize that Barrick is one of the largest gold miners in the world, and suspending its
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operations is not something to be taken lightly. It is also important to note that Barrick was not
the only company affected in this way in Chile. Another example, in the same time period, is
Canada's Kinross Gold Corporation (TSX, NYSE: KGC), the world's fifth largest gold miner,
which operated the largest gold mine in Chile. The mine accounted for about 15% of Chilean
gold production and some 8% of Kinross' global production. Concerned about water quality,
local communities had been demonstrating because these local communities used the same
water source as the mine. Chile's environmental regulator, following regulatory hearings, closed
the water system linked to the Maricunga mine, which forced the mine to shut down. Reuters
reported that similar demonstrations across the country had influenced the government to
become stricter regarding environmental regulations. After the company suspended operations
at Maricunga because of the environmental concerns raised by the Chilean regulator, some of
its Chilean assets were sold in 2017 to Goldcorp (TSX: G; NYSE: GG).5
We suggest that the institutional environment in Chile supported these outcomes. In general,
Chile has a relatively accessible governance and institutional environment, particularly with respect
to mining. The strength of resource governance can be evaluated by a variety of policies ranging
from revenue royalties to environmental regulations. For example, the Natural Resource Gover-
nance Institute (NRGI) publishes a Resource Governance Index that ranks 81 countries according
to their governance of the oil, gas, and mining sectors. In the 2016 rankings, Norway ranks first
with respect to oil and gas, while Chile ranks first with respect to mining. Thus, Chile has a strong
governance and institutional environment, at least with respect to resource governance. However,
it is important to note that the NRGI also includes measures of the broad “enabling environment,”
which includes measures such as voice and accountability, rule of law, and open data. In addition,
Chile joined the OECD in 2010, and thus became subject to OECD environmental guidelines and
reporting standards (OECD, 2016). It is perhaps no accident that it was just after this that the
Barrick decision was made. More specifically, this example suggests that in countries with institu-
tions that support stakeholder inclusion and mobilization, political accessibility, and opportunities,
a strong legal system providing enforcement by the courts, and information accessibility, focal firms
face increased potential nonmarket risks relative to countries with weaker institutions.
In short, we argue that when a mine is located close to a significant water source in a coun-
try with strong institutions supporting collective action, the potential nonmarket environmental
and social risks increase. Hence,
Hypothesis 4 The negative announcement effects of a mining property's proximity to an environ-
mentally sensitive water source will increase (i.e., be more negative) when host country insti-
tutions support collective action.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Sample and data
We built a unique data set beginning with data on mining sites around the world, their locations,
and announcements regarding their operations. These were obtained from the SNL Metals & Min-
ing Database, which provides detailed information about the operational and financial activities of
5http://www.kinross.com/news-and-investors/news-releases/press-release-details/2017/Kinross-completes-sale-of-Cerro-
Casale-interest/default.aspx.
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the mining industry around the globe. The database has been widely used in academic research
and is regarded as a comprehensive and reliable one (Murguía, Bringezu, & Schaldach, 2016).
From the database, we collected data on announcements that bring a mine closer to production or
increased production, and therefore to positive or enhanced revenues.6 As such they are expected
to have positive announcement effects, other things equal. We focus on these events, which are
nonenvironmental, to measure potential environmental risk.
By matching the SNL Metals & Mining Database with Bloomberg data, we were able to
identify and download 3,247 announcements by 1,997 mining sites from 1,131 mining compa-
nies that were listed on NYSE (USA), NYSE MKT (USA), TSX (Canada), TVS (Canada),
AIMLSE (UK), and ASX (Australia). We selected these stock markets because they are the most
important in the world for listing mining companies and covered more than 85% of the mining
companies in our sample data. Of these 3,247 announcements, only 23% of total announce-
ments (745) were positive and nonenvironmental events. After eliminating confounding events,
nonpositive and environmental events, and mining sites with minority ownership, and account-
ing for missing values (largely financial data), the final sample consists of 303 announcements
by 234 mining sites from 209 companies in 37 countries between 2013 and 2016, when the event
window is 6 days [−1, +4].
We used the WWF's Global Lakes and Wetlands Database (GLWD, Level 3) (Lehner &
Döll, 2004) to define water sources on a global scale. We then combined GLWD with WRI's
Aqueduct Global Maps Data (Aqueduct), which includes indicators of water quantity and water
quality (Gassert et al., 2014), to measure water risk-adjusted proximity, that is, the degree of both
quantity and quality water risk weighted by distance, which we note is an inverse measure of dis-
tance. We used the World Banks' World Governance Indicators (WGI), Reporters Without Bor-
ders' World Press Freedom Index (WPFI), and World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness
Index (GCI) to measure institutions supporting collective actions. We combined the Voice and
Accountability score from WGI, WPFI, and the Judicial Independence score from GCI to create a
single index. We also collected other information at the mining site level including the UNWorld
Population Prospects Adjusted Population Density under the Gridded Population of the World
(GPW) to measure population density surrounding mining sites, and Global Mosaics of the Stan-
dard MODIS Land Cover Type Data (MODIS) published by the University of Maryland to mea-
sure proximity from mining sites to built-up areas. Financial data for the mining companies that
owned the relevant mining sites were obtained from Bureau van Dijk's ORBIS database.
Finally, we collected country-level political, environmental, and economic information from
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2017, Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 2016
created by Yale University, Columbia University, and the World Economic Forum, Artisanal
and Small-Scale Mining Knowledge Sharing Archive (ASM Inventory) provided by
artisanalmining.org, as well as the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). Geo-
graphic distance between host (mining sites) and home (mining companies) countries was
drawn from the Lauder Institute, University of Pennsylvania, and cultural distance between
host and home countries was measured by using the Kogut and Singh (1988) method. Data for
robustness tests using proximity to other protected ecological areas and leisure sites were
obtained from World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) published by the UN Environment
Program (Bertzky & Stoll-Kleemann, 2009); croplands from MODIS; and excluded ethnic
6The events include announcements of a feasibility study (started, completed, and expansion); construction (project
started, financing obtained, permitting completed, and construction underway); and production (preproduction,
production started, and production expanded).
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groups from Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relations (GeoEPR) from the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich.
3.2 | Event study
A general approach to analyzing the effect of nonmarket risks on firm performance, and the
one taken in this study, is to use the event study method to measure stock market responses to
specific discrete events or announcements. The event study approach examines the degree to
which the stock market responds negatively (positively) to negative (positive) announcements
regarding events associated with the firm, and thus in principle avoids interpretation problems
associated with confounding events. Our use of the event study methodology assumes that stock
markets price fully all available relevant information. Further, we make no specific assumptions
about information asymmetry or any other market imperfection. Markets aggregate the avail-
able information and prices reflect this aggregation (Lo, 2007). Therefore, the market response
to any event or announcement represents unanticipated changes. In addition, the information
available to mining analysts will, we believe, alert them to water issues and their relation to
communities. For example, major consulting firms evaluate risks in the mining industry and
water risks feature prominently in those reports (Deloitte, 2018; EY, 2014).
We emphasize that potential risks from proximity are likely to be felt at all stages of the min-
ing cycle (Franks et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2013), and announcements that the firm is entering
a new stage provide new and relevant information regarding both potential future revenues and
costs. Thus, efficient capital markets will evaluate all new and existing information and adjust
security prices to reflect the cost and revenue prospects for the firm (Lo, 2007). Announcements
that bring the mine closer to production or increased production bring it closer to earning reve-
nues (or greater revenues), and in this respect are positive but may also change the investors'
perception of potential costs arising from negative externalities (King & Soule, 2007). Thus, costs
associated with negative externalities may be re-evaluated at each stage depending on the ability
and incentives for collective action. Efficient markets will, therefore, balance the potential reve-
nue gains against the potential costs at each stage of the mining cycle. This balancing may pro-
vide more weight to the possibility of loss if investors are loss averse.
We applied the multimarket event study method to calculate the stock returns of the mining com-
panies around the dates on which the relevant mining events occurred. First, we estimated the normal
returns (~R) of the mining companies for each of their events using their stock prices within an
estimation window of between 150 days before an event date and 31 days before an event date
(i.e., [−150, −31]). Second, we computed the abnormal returns (AR) to a company, obtained by
subtracting predicted return from the actual return of a mining company. A positive AR implies
that an event has an unexpected positive impact on a company's stock return and vice versa.
3.3 | Measures
3.3.1 | Dependent variable
Our dependent variable, cumulative abnormal return (CAR), is calculated by summing the ARs
during an event window. We computed CAR for 6-day ([−1, +4]) and 2-day ([0, +1]) windows.
CAR reflects the total impact of an event on a company's stock price.
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3.3.2 | Independent variables
Our first independent variable is water risk-adjusted proximity between a mining site and a
water source. We used Geographic Information System (ArcGIS) to compute this variable by
measuring the shortest Euclidean distance from a mining site's location to the nearest water
source (either river or lake) based on GLWD and by extracting the indices of physical water risk
in terms of water quantity and water quality, both of which range from 0 to 5, from Aqueduct.
Water risk-adjusted proximity is measured as the sum of the two Aqueduct indices of water
quantity and water quality divided by the log of Euclidean distance and is standardized.
The rest of our independent variables are the moderators in Hypotheses 2–4. Our first mod-
erator is a dummy variable indicating whether a mining site is a gold mine based on the pri-
mary mineral commodity extracted during mining operations as reported in the SNL Metals &
Mining Database. Our second moderator is a dummy variable indicating whether the nearest
water source to a mining site is a river (including freshwater marsh, where drinking water is
accessible) as opposed to other types of water source, such as lakes and reservoirs, categorized
in GLWD.
Our third moderator, institutions supporting collective actions, is measured as the sum of
three standardized variables, including WGI's Voice and Accountability, Reporters Without
Borders' WPFI, which is reverse coded because the raw value of WPFI denotes 0 as the freest
and 100 as the least free, and GCI's Judicial Independence. We based these measures on the
social movement literature (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; King, 2008; McAdam et al., 1996),
which as discussed above suggests three factors that increase the likelihood of collective action:
mobilizing structures; political opportunities; and framing structures. Voice and Accountability
is a proxy for mobilizing structure, which is measured by the extent to which a country's citi-
zens are able to participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, free-
dom of association, and a free media. Judicial Independence is a proxy for political
opportunities, which is measured by the degree to which the judicial system of a country is
independent from the influences of the government, individuals, or companies. World Press
Freedom Index (WPFI) is a proxy for framing structures, which is measured by media freedom
based on an evaluation of pluralism, independence of the media, quality of legislative frame-
work, and safety of journalists in each country and region.
Figure 1 maps the level of institutions supporting collective actions and the water sources
(rivers and lakes) in each country.
3.3.3 | Control variables
We included variables to control for both event- and site-specific factors including population
density surrounding mining sites, proximity to built-up areas, revenue changes during the event
window, changes in operating expenses, and dummy variables for the production stage and
mine type. We also included company-specific control variables including the log of the mining
company's total managed assets, book-to-market ratio, log of leverage, percentage of ownership,
and a dummy for foreign ownership. Finally, we included country-specific control variables
including EPI's water and sanitation index, political particularism from DPI, extent of artisanal
and small-scale mining, log of land size, log of gross domestic product (GDP), percentage of
metal exports, geographic and cultural distances between the host countries and the home
countries of the mining companies, and fixed effects for the home country of the mining
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companies and the year of the mining events. These variables are explained in detail in Online
Supplementary Appendix.
3.4 | Estimation
Because our data have a nested structure (mining locations within a host country), we esti-
mated the impact of water risk-adjusted proximity as well as the moderating effects of gold
mine, river, and institutions on CAR using a multilevel random effect panel regression with
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the host country level to determine
whether mining companies that operate near significant water sources were penalized by stock
markets. We also used the number of events by event type and host country as the weight for
the lower level of the multilevel regression model, and the number by host country for the
higher level, to correct for the differences in probabilities of occurrence for different event types
conditional on different host countries.7 When testing moderating effects, we created interac-
tion terms using mean-centered variables.
FIGURE 1 Water sources and institutions supporting collective actions. Note: White areas in the map
represent countries whose values are missing in at least one of three scores composing institutions supporting
collective actions (i.e., WGI's Voice and Accountability, Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index,
and GCI's Judicial Independence) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
7In our multilevel model, since the events of the mining locations comprise the lower level, and the host countries of
the mining locations comprise the higher level, the scaling of weights by event type is considered for each host country.
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4 | RESULTS
The summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables for the sample of 303 events are
presented in Table 1. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test shows that the model VIF is 4.46
with fixed effects and 3.14 without fixed effects. Multicollinearity is thus not a concern in our
analysis. On average, the sampled events led to an increase in about 1.3 and 2.1% of CAR over
the 6-day and 2-day event windows, respectively, which may not be considered large, but does
include the negative effects that constitute the subject of this study.
The main results of the fixed-effects multilevel panel regressions for our sample are shown
in Table 2. We provided results in Columns 1 to 5 for a 6-day event window ([−1, +4]) and in
Columns 6 to 10 for a 2-day event window ([0, +1]).
For both [−1, +4] and [0, +1], water risk-adjusted proximity significantly lowers CAR
(β = −0.0336, SE = 0.0127, p = .008, see Column 2; β = −0.0290, SE = 0.0091, p = .001, see Col-
umn 7). The statistical results support Hypothesis . Although the moderating effect of gold mine
is insignificant (β = 0.0145, SE = 0.0116, p = .211, see Column 3; β = 0.0121, SE = 0.0104,
p = .243, see Column 8), the moderating effect of river is significant and negative (β = −0.0528,
SE = 0.0097, p = .0000, see Column 4; β = −0.0534, SE = 0.0051, p = .0000, see Column 9).
Moreover, the strength of institutions negatively and significantly moderates the negative rela-
tionship between the proximity to a water source and CAR (β = −0.0065, SE = 0.0026, p = .012,
see Column 5; β = −0.0059, SE = 0.0022, p = .007, see Column 10). These results support
Hypotheses 3 and 4 but do not support Hypothesis .
The direct effect of water risk-adjusted proximity shows that any positive impact of an
announcement by a mining company is attenuated when its mining site is located near an envi-
ronmentally sensitive water source. Based on the results in Column 2 of Table 2, an increase in
water risk-adjusted proximity (meaning the mine is closer to the water source) by 1 SD will
lower the CAR of the 6-day window by 3.4%, which is equivalent to 21.7% of the SD of the
CAR. Water risk-adjusted distance proximity is economically as important as the effect of book-
to-market ratio, which is frequently used as a predictor of stock returns in the event study liter-
ature (Brown & Warner, 1985). A 1 SD increase in the book-to-market ratio will increase the
CAR of the 6-day window by 3.34%, which is equivalent to 21.3% of the SD of the CAR. These
results underscore the importance of potential nonmarket risks in the context of mining opera-
tions near environmentally sensitive water sources.
Although the moderating effect of a gold mine is not economically meaningful, a river's
moderating effect is substantial. When water risk-adjusted proximity is high (mean value
plus 1 SD), a mine will lose about 5% of its stock returns if it locates close to a river. On the
other hand, when water risk-adjusted proximity is low (mean value minus 1 SD), the mine
will gain about 5% stock returns if it locates close to a river. This suggests that in some
cases, a mine may be located near a river with low water risk, allowing the company to use
the resource without potential conflict.
The moderating effect of institutions on the relationship between water risk-adjusted prox-
imity and CAR implies that a mining company operating in a country where voice and account-
ability, press freedom, and judicial independence are strong will experience an abnormal
decrease in its stock return for an announced operational event at a mine if the mine is located
near a significant environmentally sensitive water source. Figure 2 illustrates the results from
the 6-day event window ([−1, +4]). According to the results, a 1 SD increase of water risk-
adjusted proximity will lower the CAR of the 6-day window by 3.89%, which is equivalent to
24.77% of the SD of the CAR in a country with strong institutions supporting collective actions
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such as Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom, while it will lead to negligible change (lower
by 0.45%) in the CAR in a country with weak institutions (mean − 1 SD) such as Peru, Philip-
pines, and Tanzania. The magnitude of the decrease in CAR will be much larger for countries
with even stronger institutions (mean + 2 SDs) such as the Nordic countries and New Zealand.
Countries with very weak institutions (mean − 2 SDs) such as China, Colombia, and Russia
have slightly positive returns when the mine locates close to a water source. This implies that
in the absence of strong institutions, stock markets do not perceive firm-specific nonmarket
risks, and indeed view the access to proximate water positively for that reason. Overall, the eco-
nomic magnitudes of our findings also provide strong support for Hypothesis . For the 2-day
event window ([0, +1]), we provide the illustration of moderating effect in Online
Supplementary Appendix.
Both the statistical results in Table 2 and the economic magnitudes in Figure 2 suggest that
stock markets do account for potential risks associated with the location of mining sites, and
the effects vary by the level of strength of institutions. Put differently, when a mine locates dis-
tant from an environmentally sensitive water source, overall CARs are higher for countries with
strong institutions than for countries with weak institutions. Thus, although strong institutions
of host countries overall provide positive premia, when mining operations are one step close to
production or increased production, the premia dissipate when potential risks associated with
mining operations are very high (high proximity) such that CARs become lower for countries
with strong institutions compared with countries with weak institutions. Thus, markets impose
higher penalties for firms operating in countries with strong institutions than in countries with
weak institutions.
In Figure 3, we spatially estimated Model 5 in Table 2 using the information on water risk-
adjusted proximity, institutions supporting collective actions, and CAR from the [−1, +4] event
window as of 2015 and projected on a map by using ArcGIS. Figure 3 shows that the mining
sites that are associated with positive (negative) CAR generally are in countries where the
strength of institutions supporting collective action is strong (weak). This result is consistent
with the notion that firms operating in countries with weak institutions are penalized more
than those operating in countries with strong institutions, a result consistent with the non-
market and international business literatures.
However, Figure 3 also shows the differences in CARs corresponding to water risk-adjusted
proximity within each country. In countries with strong institutions supporting collective
action, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, while most mining sites are associated





























Very weak institutions (mean – 2*SD)
Weak institutions (mean – SD)
Average institutions (mean)
Strong institutions (mean + SD)
Very strong institutions (mean + 2*SD)
Water risk adjusted proximity
FIGURE 2 The moderating effects of
institutions supporting collective actions
(6 days CAR). Note: Estimation window is
[−150, −31]. Based on the results in
Column 5 of Table 2 [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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negative CARs. In countries with average institutions, such as South Africa and Spain, while all
of the mining sites experience lower CARs than countries with strong institutions, CARs are
more negative for sites with higher water risk-adjusted proximity. In countries with weak insti-
tutions, such as Tanzania and Peru, CARs are negative with negligible change at different levels
of water risk. Countries with even weaker institutions, such as China and Russia, show about
the same pattern. Thus, in countries with non-supportive institutions, there is little variance in
CARs, which would be consistent with the idea that collective actions do not impose material
costs on the companies in countries that are less supportive of collective actions regardless of
the project locations. Put differently, collective actions may occur in countries with less support-
ive institutions, but they are not likely successful because mobilizing structures, political oppor-
tunities, and framing structures are weak. In some countries like China and Russia, collective
action may occur, but government agencies and regulators may not at all be influenced by any
collective action and do not suspend or halt projects that potentially damage water resources.
For the results from the 2-day event window ([0, +1]; Model 10 in Table 2), we provide the map
in Online Supplementary Appendix.
4.1 | Robustness checks
To test the robustness of our main results, we performed several additional tests. These robust-
ness check results and further discussion are available in a separate Online
FIGURE 3 Water risk-adjusted proximity and cumulative abnormal return (6 days event window for
calculating CAR). Note: Estimation window is [−150, −31]. Based on the results in Column 5 of Table 2.
Institutions as of 2015 are used. White areas in the map represent water sources, except for Greenland, of which
water risk values are missing in Aqueduct [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Supplementary Appendix. None of these robustness check results are inconsistent with our
main results. Here, we highlight the most important results. First, considering that mining may
put not only water sources but also other ecological, environmental, and socioeconomic activi-
ties at risk, we computed the proximity (unweighted) between the focal mine and various other
environmentally sensitive sites such as protected ecological and leisure areas and included them
as variables in the model. We find almost no evidence that proximity between the focal mine,
and these areas are significant with the exception of leisure sites in the two-day event window.
Second, we conducted subgroup analysis by stages in the mining life cycle and by popula-
tion density. We found that the direct effect of water risk-adjusted proximity and its interaction
with river and institutions are negative and stronger in the feasibility study stage than in the
construction and production stages. These results are consistent with those reported in Franks
et al. (2014). We also show that the direct effect of water risk-adjusted proximity is negative and
significant for both low and medium population density samples, but not for the high popula-
tion density sample. These results are consistent with Olson's (1965) boundary condition on col-
lective action: smaller and localized groups are more likely to organize and be effective.
However, the water risk-adjusted proximity interactions with institutions are negative only for
the medium population density sample.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that nonmarket risk, which we associate with potential stakeholder collective
action, is higher when a mine is located closer to an environmentally sensitive water source,
where “environmentally sensitive” is defined by quantity and quality of water risk associated
with that source. We use proximity as a theoretically grounded proxy for unobservable non-
market risk potential and rely on stock market responses to measure it. Our results are consis-
tent and robust in suggesting that stock markets do apply a discount to mine announcements
that bring a mine located near an environmentally sensitive water source closer to production
or expansion.
We ground our empirical results on a model that assumes that the possibility of collective
action begins with the local community affected by the focal mine. We argue that when nega-
tive externalities are localized, and when local stakeholder groups share similar values and
interests, free rider problems are minimized. However, the social movements literature points
out that collective action by social movements is relatively rare (McAdam & Boudet, 2012), and
so we consider the mechanisms that promote effective collective action. These mechanisms
include the resources to engage in mobilization, and access to the complementary institutions
(political and social) that support collective action. We suggest that mining operations with the
potential to affect the quantity and quality of water sources are more likely to provide the incen-
tives and ability to engage in effective collective action.
Although we used collective action and social movement theory as a theoretical lens, our
empirical analysis is undertaken from the perspective of investors. We have argued that inves-
tors respond to nonmarket risks associated with potential collective action directed at a focal
mine. These actions could impose costs on the firm in the form of delays, disruptions, or clo-
sure. This is different from the concerns of relevant stakeholders who, according to one defini-
tion, consider successful collective action as one that results in changes in corporate behavior
(King, 2008; Vasi & King, 2012). Although we took an investor's perspective and did not mea-
sure successful collective action, our approach is consistent with King (2008, p. 41) who
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proposed that investor reaction is a mediator between collective action and the ultimate success
of the collective action in changing a company's behavior.
Our study contributes to the broad literature on nonmarket risk in an international context.
We extend the nonmarket strategy literature by examining the impact of cross national institu-
tional differences, a recognized gap in the literature (Davis et al., 2008; Doh et al., 2012; Mellahi
et al., 2016), particularly in the case of event studies on sustainability that are often undertaken
within a single jurisdiction (Hawn et al., 2018). We use collective action and social movement
theory to justify mine location as a proxy for the incentive and ability of stakeholders' mobiliza-
tion, which poses a potential nonmarket risk to mines. Our reliance on stock markets to mea-
sure the potential firm-specific nonmarket risk and our clear identification of the importance of
cross-country institutional heterogeneity are all components of this contribution. A feature of
the literature on nonmarket risk in general, and the specific case of socio-environmental risk, is
that scholars have relied on past observations regarding stakeholder conflicts (Giordono
et al., 2018; Henisz et al., 2014; Hiatt, Grandy, & Lee, 2015; Vasi & King, 2012) or environmen-
tal incidents (Busch, Bauer, & Orlitzky, 2016). Estimating nonmarket risks in this way requires
a sufficient number of observations so that potential or future risks can be estimated using past
events (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). However, collective action by stakeholders directed against a spe-
cific company at a specific location can be rare, making it difficult to forecast future risk. We
have therefore proposed the use of proximity to water as a measure of potential nonmarket risk
and examined some of boundary conditions that allow realistic forecasts of future risk for a spe-
cific firm in a given location.
Our results are robust in supporting the hypothesis that mine proximity to environmentally
sensitive water sources is taken into account by stock markets. We have argued that water
sources may have unique environmental consequences, noting the special status of water as a
human right and a scarce resource. Water tends to be a shared resource with common property
and at times public goods characteristics and as such may be more prone to conflict. An impor-
tant implication of our results is that there may be important differences in the social and envi-
ronmental risks associated with proximity to other sites such as croplands, protected ecological
areas, and leisure sites. When we control for the proximity of the mine to such non-water sites,
we find no evidence that markets apply similar discounts to mines located near those sites. It is
therefore possible that the relatively unique nature of water resources encourages and facilitates
collective action and it is therefore important to carefully specify the underlying characteristics
of the resources that are potential sources of conflict, the degree to which they encourage
groups to mobilize, and the nature of access to political and social structures.
In a cross-national setting, we argue that in countries with strong institutions, which sup-
port collective action, the conditions for effective stakeholder collective action are more salient,
and that, therefore, firms in these countries face higher degrees of potential nonmarket risk.
Indeed, we find that mines located in countries where such institutions are stronger face larger
risk premia, suggesting in turn that in such countries the ability of stakeholder groups to engage
in successful collective action is enhanced by these institutions. In this case, strong institutions
are ones that protect the ability of groups to organize and mobilize, provide access to the courts,
regulatory authorities and political processes, and assure the dissemination of information
through the media.
Our results with respect to institutions stand in contrast to those obtained in both the inter-
national business and nonmarket strategy literature studies. The international business litera-
ture is rooted in transaction cost economics and suggests that spatial transaction costs and their
associated risks increase in countries with weak institutions, imposing transactional uncertainty
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(Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Mudambi et al., 2018). The institutional approach to nonmarket
strategy, also rooted in transaction cost economics, but not necessarily in an international con-
text, arrives at a similar conclusion (Dorobantu, Kaul, et al., 2017). Thus, analyses based on
institutional theory and transaction cost economics tend to conclude that weaker institutions
increase transactional uncertainty and thus are associated with nonmarket risk. In addition to
the imposition of transactions costs, countries with weaker institutors firms cannot rely on
external institutional capacity to help them respond to external threats (Holburn &
Zelner, 2010; Oh & Oetzel, 2011).
We extend both the international business and nonmarket strategy literatures by focusing
on socioenvironmental issues using a different theoretical lens. Using social movement theory,
we focus on nonmarket risks that arise from the potential of firms to impose negative externali-
ties on communities. This leads us to conclude that nonmarket risks are higher in countries
with strong institutions supporting collective action. In such countries, firms face a higher prob-
ability that they will be affected by collective actions that impose material costs on the firm.
Although we rely on collective action and social movement theory to arrive at this conclusion,
our analysis is consistent with a neo-institutional approach to nonmarket strategy (Doh
et al., 2012). The neo-institutional perspective explicitly considers the interaction of firms with
their external stakeholders as part of the institutional context (Doh et al., 2012). Rather than
beginning with the view that firms respond to external institutional pressures, both social
movement theory and neo-institutional theory consider that the actions of firms can create
institutional pressures, including the possibility of collective action. In our case, the result is
that such pressures are greater in stronger institutional environments.
Our results provide consistent support for the hypothesis that in countries with strong insti-
tutions that support collective action, firm-specific nonmarket risk for mining companies is
higher. Thus, our analysis and our results suggest a more nuanced approach to assessing non-
market risk in an international context. In particular, we suggest that the more explicit atten-
tion be given to the theoretical lens through which the problem is being analyzed. At least in
the area of the socioenvironmental risk we analyze, stronger institutions are not associated with
lower firm-specific nonmarket risk. Accordingly, it is important for future researchers to be
careful in using broad measures of country risk to apply to all firm decisions, including location
decisions. Specifically, the definition of country risk should be carefully matched to the nature
of the relevant investment, the contextual characteristics of industry, and the theoretical frame-
work through which it is analyzed.
Our empirical results also point to the existence of other boundary conditions that can affect
the incentive and ability of local stakeholders to engage in effective collective action. We find
that when the nearest water source is a river, stock market responses are more negative, which
we would attribute in part to the increased possibility that collective actions may diffuse along
the river, and could involve a network of interacting stakeholders (Hargrave & Van de
Ven, 2006; Rowley, 1997). The results are also consistent with the idea that collective action is
more likely when population density is not high, as free-riding is reduced in relatively smaller
groups. However, we find no evidence that markets respond differently to announcements
made by gold miners, despite the evidence that gold mining may have a unique impact on the
availability and quality of the water supply. One possible explanation is that although gold may
impose social costs in terms of water, the value of gold per unit extracted is also high, so that
the value of the gold per unit of risk is not different from other minerals. In addition, the posi-
tive revenue benefits may spill over to the local communities, reducing the incentive to take
action against the gold mine.
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We employ an event study methodology, which assumes that stock markets assimilate all
relevant information, and that this information is available to both investors and firms. How-
ever, even if all parties agree on the nature and extent of the risk, this does not mean that there
are clear and unambiguous strategies for risk mitigation. Risk mitigation is a complex problem.
Although dimensions of the immediate problem (proximity to water sources) are readily observ-
able, and agreed upon, the exact nature, mix, and timing of risk mitigation strategies will vary
across firms with different levels of success. In the absence of a definitive risk mitigation
approach, neither firms nor markets are able to forecast the success of any particular strategy.
The range of potential risk mitigation strategies is illustrated in recent studies (Dorobantu,
Kaul, et al., 2017; Hiatt et al., 2015; Eesley, DeCelles, and Lenox (2016)Eesley, Decelles &
Lenox, 2016; Nartey, Henisz, & Dorobantu, 2018). Both Hiatt et al. (2015) and Eesley
et al. (2016)) point out that firm strategies depend on the tactics chosen by activists, creating a
range of possible outcomes. Dorobantu, Kaul, et al. (2017) identify a wide range of strategies
that firms might choose and suggest that additive strategies are useful in addressing collective
action problems related to activist stakeholders (p. 121–122). Additive strategies supplement
existing institutional structures with new, voluntary, and decentralized ones and can encom-
pass CSR activities.
There is evidence that mining firms have taken a variety of additive measures including pro-
active investments in new water technologies to reduce their impact on water sources
(Leonida, 2019), and thus benefit both the firm and the community. However, such investments
take time, and there is no general consensus on the effectiveness of different technologies. At
the same time, proactive measures directed at the community to provide public goods
(Marquis & Raynard, 2015), which may or may not be related to the original externality, have
also been pursued. In addition, the provision of such community infrastructure in pursuit of a
“social license to operate” (SLO) can itself be both time consuming, expensive, and not applica-
ble across all locations (Shapiro et al., 2018), thus further raising costs. Davis and Franks (2014)
suggest that there is only limited evidence regarding the success of such initiatives.
Thus, firms face choices regarding the appropriate stakeholder strategy, a choice that can be
difficult when resources are limited. This was illustrated by Nartey et al. (2018), who suggest
trade-offs between high- and low-status stakeholder management strategies. In our case, mining
companies in the early stages may focus on high-status stakeholders such as politicians, govern-
ments, or regulatory agencies as it is important for companies to receive LLO and meet regula-
tory requirements. Such a stakeholder management strategy may increase the investors'
valuation of nonmarket risks of collective actions from low-status stakeholders such as commu-
nities and NGOs although the effectiveness of the strategy may depend on institutional environ-
ments (Nartey et al., 2018). Although we do not observe collective action, our evidence suggests
that investors also believe that stakeholder mobilization is higher in early stages, but only for
countries with strong institutions supporting collective action. Our results are consistent with
the view that high-status stakeholder management strategies are more effective in weaker insti-
tutional environments.
Finally, our results are based on the mining industry, which may have unique characteris-
tics that separate it from other industries (Shapiro et al., 2018). However, our analysis is likely
relevant for any projects that have long investment cycles and/or impose localized negative
externalities that affect local communities, such as pipelines (McAdam et al., 2010), dams
(Kirchherr et al., 2016), and wind turbines (Giordono et al., 2018). Thus, our analysis is likely to
apply beyond the mining industry to include other extractive and energy projects, and large
infrastructure projects. In these cases, collective action may or may not be related to water, but
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we speculate that its unique characteristics make successful collective action more likely when
water is involved. At the same time, disputes over water may result in collective action, even
outside of these industries. For example, after low rainfall during the monsoon in 2016, more
than a million vendors in Southern India boycotted Coca-Cola and Pepsi products because they
exploited and threatened limited water resources in the region (Doshi, 2017). This case suggests
that collective action may occur in other industries when communities compete with compa-
nies over the usage rights of resources. Thus, our findings may apply to any industry that com-
petes with communities to use valuable public goods or common pool resources.
5.1 | Limitations and future research
First, we consider a model in which collective action is initiated by local groups and facilitated
by access to complementary political, social, and media institutions. Although we believe that
this view is supported by anecdotal and case study evidence, and that we have taken care to
define institutional strength to reflect this view, it is true that causality remains an important
question for future research, as is the question of how these elements interact. For example, it
may be the case that media pressures and public opinion create strong political incentives for
governments to impose stringent regulations that impose costs on firms. Similarly, causality
may begin not with collective action, but with a strong regulatory resource regime that in turn
encourages collective action. It is quite likely that establishing causality will be difficult, but
more evidence that stakeholders mobilize against mining companies when they see potential
environmental damages in proximate water sources would be a useful first step. Even if causal-
ity can be established, it is not clear whether all complementary institutions are necessary for
success, and in what degree. Again, future research should be directed to this question.
Second, our analysis has relied on the theory of collective action and social movements to
infer the nature and source of nonmarket risk. However, we do not actually observe collective
action nor do we explicitly model the complex interaction between firms, investors, and stake-
holders. There may well be other ways to attack the complexity of potential nonmarket risk and
in particular risk mitigation strategies by explicitly examining these interactions.
6 | CONCLUSION
We conclude that stock markets apply a discount to otherwise positive announcements by min-
ing companies whose mines are located near environmentally sensitive water sources, particu-
larly rivers, and the negative response is even stronger when the mines are located in countries
with strong institutions that support collective action. We have argued that proximity to water
sources is a proxy for the potential nonmarket risks created by localized negative environmental
externalities, which in turn are associated with both the incentive and ability for local stake-
holders to engage in collective action to prevent the negative externalities. Moreover, we extend
the analysis across host country institutional environments and suggest that institutional con-
text matters in terms of market valuation of potential environmental and social risks. Contrary
to other analyses of nonmarket risk, in the specific case that we examine, mines located near
environmentally sensitive water sources in countries with strong institutions are more likely to
have their announcements discounted by stock markets, that is, firm-specific nonmarket risk
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associated with social and environmental concerns may be quite different from those associated
with political concerns.
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